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Abstract
Niels Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity in order to give a general account of quantum
mechanics, however he stressed that the idea of complementarity is related to the general difficulty
in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object. The com-
plementary descriptions approach is a framework for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, more
specifically, it focuses in the development of the idea of complementarity and the concept of potential-
ity in the orthodox quantum formulation. In PART I of this article, we analyze the ideas of Bohr and
present the principle of complementary description which takes into account Einstein’s ontological
position. We argue, in PART II, that this development allows a better understanding of some of the
paradigmatic interpretational problems in quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem
and the quantum to classical limit. We conclude that one should further develop complementarity in
order to elaborate a consistent worldview.
Introduction
In this article I would like to develop in a more technical way the ideas presented in [47]. More specifically, I
will turn my attention to the problem of the quantum to classical limit through the analysis of the quantum
theory of measurement and several of the most paradigmatic phenomena in the quantum domain.
The paper is organized in two main sections. In section 1, I describe the different levels of description
regarding the quantum theory of measurement. Firstly, we present the ‘quantum description’ taking into
account the distinction between classical and quantum concepts. Secondly, we take into account the
‘quantum perspective’. We continue to define the ‘quantum context’, the ‘classical context’ and analyze
their relation. Finally, we take into account the ‘empirical’ level of description. In section 2, I study several
of the interpretational problems regarding quantum mechanics and present the answers provided by the
complementary descriptions approach. Firstly, we analyze the paradigmatic Stern-Gerlach experiment
as a more general expression of the measurement problem and the quantum to classical limit. Secondly,
we study from this approach the Schro¨dinger cat paradox. Thirdly, we discuss the relation between
the quantum and the classical descriptions related to the Bell inequalities and the hidden measurement
approach by the Brussels group. Finally, I present the conclusions.
1 Levels of Description in the Quantum Theory of Measurement
In this section I will use the definitions presented in ([47], Sect. 2) to develop the different levels of
description expressed in the quantum theory of measurement.
Planck introduced the quantum of action in 1900 producing a complete break through the system of
classical mechanics and electrodynamics; but nevertheless he was forced to continue to use this system.
“This dual position constitutes from the beginning an epistemological paradox. In order to overcome it
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or alleviate it, it became necessary at the very least to attempt a definite connection between the two
languages which physics now had to employ continuously and side by side.”1 My aim in the following
section will be to expose as explicitly as possible the independence of these two languages; showing that
the classical and the quantum description are complementary2. For this purpose we will analyze the
different levels of description taken into account by orthodox quantum mechanics. My claim is that every
level, which is determined by the concepts involved, is independent with respect to a different level, in
which the concepts used might not be compatible.
When analyzing the measurement problem from the complementary descriptions approach we assume
there are different levels of descriptions in which the process takes place, each of them with the same
ontological status, but with different conceptual schemes applied. As discussed in ([47], Sect. 4) within
certain definite contexts the concepts can be “used” (as if they were the same concept) by different
(complementary) descriptions at the same time; however, when extending the meaning of the concept to
the general framework of either level incompatibilities and paradoxes appear.
1.1 The Quantum Description: Classical and Quantum Concepts
I take the quantum description to be defined by its formalism, namely, Dirac’s formulation on Hilbert
space [27] (which is equivalent to Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics or the matrix mechanics formulation
developed by Heisenberg, Born and Jordan), together with the interpretation.
There are two main questions regarding the interpretation of the quantum formalism. Firstly: what is
the ontology regarding the Schro¨dinger wave function? Secondly: what is the meaning of a superposition?
These two questions are in many cases confused and taken to be equivalent. I will try to show that each
of them has it’s own independence regarding the meaning of the quantum theory. These two questions
will be further analyzed in section 1.2 and 1.3. In the following section we will focus on the description
given by quantum mechanics and the concepts involved stressing the incompatibilities with the concepts
presented in the classical framework.
1.1.1 The Concepts of “Space” and “Time”
The time evolution of the wave function description is completely deterministic and expresses the pos-
sible correlations that will appear in the selection of the different possible contexts. Heisenberg ([35],
p.65), Bohr ([60], pp.88-92) and Pauli ([38], p.126) made it clear that the description in terms of wave
function precludes the possibility to maintain a classical space-time description3. This ‘limitation’ was
imposed in the description by the quantum postulate, which states that any change in action must be
an integral multiple of Planck’s constant. Thus, “[quantum mechanic’s] essence may be expressed in the
so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather
individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck’s constant of action.”4
It was the acknowledgement of such limitations (as epistemological principles) which led Heisenberg to
the development of the new quantum formulation; as Bohr explains:
“As is known, the new development was connected in a fundamental paper by Heisenberg, were he
succeeded in emancipating himself completely from the classical concept of motion by replacing
from the very start the ordinary kinematical and mechanical quantities by symbols which refer directly
to the individual processes demanded by the quantum postulate.” N. Bohr ([11] quoted from [60],
p.106, emphasis added)
1E. Cassirer quoted from ([15], p.111).
2One could argue, following Ernst Cassirer ([15], p.89) that this state of affairs is quite equivalent to that of dynamical
and statistical laws: “With statistics a new method and a new instrument of description was introduced into science, an
instrument which was proved usable and eminently fruitful even in those areas where the existing classical methods failed.
However instead of comprehending the significance of this new method and of appreciating its particular logical character,
instead of allowing it its due position in the systematic totality of physical determination, exactly the opposite path was
chosen. Dynamic and statistical laws were not regarded as two complementary methods and directions, as two different
modes of description; they were instead opposed as the “determined” and the “undetermined”.”
3One should acknowledge however that this is a question which is deeply connected with the interpretation one is willing
to make of the quantum formalism; for example if one takes the Bohmian interpretation it is possible to maintain a classical
conception of position and trajectory.
4Bohr quoted from [12], p.53.
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The quantum description rests on the fundamental presupposition of a discrete description5. This
does not preclude the quantum description from using the concept of space within a definite context; i.e.
the Schro¨dinger wave mechanics in the position representation. What remains still not possible, is to
maintain a consistent view together with the context given by the momentum representation (as it can
be done in classical mechanics). Space and time in the quantum description are not the same concepts
as space and time in the classical mechanics; Heisenberg ([38], p.112) was aware of the difficulty of using
such concepts in the quantum formulation: “that space and time are actually only statistical concepts,
as, perhaps, are temperature, pressure, etc. in a gas. I mean, that space-like and time-like concepts are
meaningless for one particle, and that they become more and more meaningful the more particles are
treated.” Such difficulty stands from the fact quantum mechanics is a theory created with completely
different epistemological principles than classical mechanics. It was in the concept of complementarity
where Bohr saw a way to regain the space-time description and causality6.
Although there exists several possibilities in order to regain a classical conception of space and time
within the quantum formulation7, I believe the beauty of physics relies in the creation of concepts which
can open new paths in the understanding and comprehension of the world. I will thus, not look back and
go further into this development.
1.1.2 The Principle of Separability
Deeply connected to the concepts of space and time stands the principle of separability; which following
Howard ([39], p.226) can be expressed:
Separability Principle: The contents of any two regions of space separated by a nonvanishing
spatio-temporal interval constitute separable physical systems, in the sense that (1) each possesses
its own, distinct physical state, and (2) the joint state of the two systems is wholly determined by
these separated states.
In other words, the presence of a nonvanishing spatio-temporal interval is a sufficient condition for the
individuation of physical systems and their associated states, then ‘physical wholes’ are not more than
the ‘sums of their parts’. One of the most important proponents of this position was Albert Einstein,
who was clearly against the holistic nature of quantum mechanics. In a letter to Max Born dated 5 April,
1948, Einstein writes:
“If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of the world of ideas of
physics, one is first stuck by the following: the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world, that
is, ideas are established relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim a ‘real existence’
that is independent of the perceiving subject –ideas which, on the other hand, have been brought into
as secure a relationship as possible with the sense-data. It is further characteristic of these physical
objects that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this
arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent
of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space’. Unless one makes this
kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are
far apart from one another in space –which stems in the first place in everyday thinking– physical
thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see any way of formulating
and testing the laws of physics unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind.” A. Einstein (quoted
from [13], p.170)
However, Einstein was aware there was no logical inconsistency in dropping this principle and ac-
cepting the holistic character of the quantum theory. At the end of the same letter he points out the
following:
“There seems to me no doubt that those physicists who regard the descriptive methods of quantum
mechanics as definite in principle would react to this line of thought in the following way: they would
drop the requirement for the independent existence of the physical reality present in different parts
5The classical description, on the other hand, is an expression of continuity. See for example the article of Von Weizsa¨cker:
Kontinuita¨t und Mo¨glichkeit [58] in which he discusses the limitations of classical and quantum descriptions.
6See for example [11] and also [42], Chap. 10: “Space, Time and Causality in Modern Physics”.
7Maybe the most famous one is that presented by David Bohm ([9] and [10]).
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of space; they would be justified in pointing out that the quantum theory nowhere makes explicit use
of this requirement.” A. Einstein (quoted from [13], p.172)
Einstein wrote that this was unacceptable to him because the price to pay was to give up physical
reality, which for him was placed by the preconditions of the separability and locality principles. As a
matter of fact, maybe this was the most important difference between the thought of Einstein and Bohr;
i.e. the difference between an epistemological and an ontological position, as Folse argues:
“[...] Einstein realism is based upon the assumption of separability, whereas Bohr’s realism is
grounded in the quantum postulate which in effect is the very denial of Einstein’s separability as-
sumption. A simple but suggestive way of expressing the philosophical reason for this difference
between Bohr and Einstein is that for Einstein the ontological demands for an objective description
precede the epistemological demands, whereas for Bohr the epistemological precede the ontological.
As we have seen, Einstein’s rejection of Bohr’s epistemological claim that we have in the quantum
formalism a complete description of physical reality is based on his view that locality and separabil-
ity must be essential conditions for any concept of physical reality that can be objectively described.
Bohr does not deny that physics describes reality, but what he does hold is that –at least if we re-
gard the effects of the quantum revolution as here to say– physics cannot make these the necessary
conditions for the physical reality if that reality is to be objectively described. Thus Bohr’s concept
of reality is derivative from his epistemology, or as he would put it, from the “epistemological lesson”
which the quantum revolution has taught us.” J. Folse ([32], p.174)
Einstein’s necessary conditions for making science possible presuppose a ‘metaphysical science’, a
‘classical science’; if this would be the case every physical theory should in a late stage reduce to classical
physics. Feynman ([30], p.129) has presented this idea in the most clear way in his famous dictum: “I think
I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.” If one presupposes that understanding
must lie within the walls of classicality then quantum mechanics will remain un-understandable forever.
But the question I would like to pose once again is: “What does one mean by ‘understanding’?”
Although reductionism has provided an important guide to science for many centuries, quantum
mechanics resists such an analysis. When a quantum state of a compound system is described by a
pure (‘entangled’) state, its subsystems cannot be described by a pure state8. The holistic path opens
a world of new ideas and concepts. The new quantum technology, which embraces projects as quantum
computers, quantum teleportation and quantum cryptography, is a clear witness to this fact.
It has been argued ([39], [53] and [54]) that all local, separable theories are empirically false when
applied to the microphysical interactions examined in the Bell type experiments, and that if one is
unwilling, as we are, to sacrifice locality, the assumption of separability must be recognized as the source
of difficulty. Furthermore, separable theories are fundamentally incompatible with quantum mechanics
because of their separable manner of individuating systems and states. That quantum mechanics tells
us about the strange entangled properties of the systems it describes is known since Schro¨dinger’s 1935
paper [51]. But by no means this is restricted to the wave picture of the quantum theory. Quantum logic
is maybe the most general framework in which quantum mechanics can be expressed9, yet we know since
Aerts [1] that even in this abstract setting the inseparability of quantum systems is factual: quantum
mechanics simply cannot describe separated systems.
Separability is one of the cornerstones of classicality, it goes together with the principle of non contra-
diction which asserts it is wrong to think at one and the same instant that which is and is not. We believe
the path laid down by the quantum theory goes against the idea of entity and although a bridge (rather
than a limit) must be build up between these complementary descriptions (the classical and the quantum)
the idea of entity should not be forced into the interpretation of the quantum formalism; rather we should
focus in finding new ways in which this character (non-separability) is exposed with all its strength.
1.1.3 The Concept of “Measurement”
The received view tells us that in classical mechanics observation does not influence in any way the object
which we study. Measurement is in this sense “outside” the theory; it is a way of acquiring information
without in any way perturbing the system. This allows us to think of a reality acquirable by the senses
8For a study of the concept of Holism see for example [52] and references therein.
9For a review in quantum logic see for example the review of Dalla Chiara and Giuntini [17].
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which is independent of the act of observation. In quantum mechanics this is not the case, we are explicitly
confronted with the fact that what we choose to study defines our system, it creates an entity and the
elements of physical reality.
It is the epistemological grounding of these two theories which allow us to find a totally different
structure in logic and language. In classical mechanics it is normally accepted that whatever we choose
to measure, it will not change our object, thus, the object is completely independent of the act of
measurement. In the quantum theory the concept of measurement has a totally different significance:
the choice of the measurement we want to perform defines the context, a context which is mutually
incompatible with other contexts; it defines the elements of physical reality of the system and thus, it
defines the entity. There is no space in quantum physics for a ‘detached observer’. Wolfgang Pauli was
very much aware of this character, as it is expressed in a letter to Niels Bohr:
“[...] it seems to me quite appropriate to call the conceptual description of nature in classical
physics, which Einstein so emphatically wishes to retain, “the ideal of the detached observer”. To
put it drastically the observer has according to this ideal to disappear entirely in a discrete manner
as hidden spectator, never as actor, nature being left alone in a predetermined course of events,
independent of the way in which phenomena are observed. “Like the moon has a definite position”
Einstein said to me last winter, “whether or not we look at the moon, the same must also hold for
the atomic objects, as there is no sharp distinction possible between these and macroscopic objects.
Observation cannot create an element of reality like position, there must be something contained
in the complete description of physical reality which corresponds to the possibility of observing a
position, already before the observation has been actually made.” I hope, that I quoted Einstein
correctly; it is always difficult to quote somebody out of memory with whom one does not agree. It
is precisely this kind of postulate which I call the ideal of the detached observer.
In quantum mechanics, on the contrary, an observation hic et nunc changes in general the “state”
of the observed system, in a way not contained in the mathematical formulated laws, which only
apply to the automatical time dependence of the state of a closed system. I think here on the
passage to a new phenomenon of observation which is taken into account by the so-called “reduction
of the wave packets”. As it is allowed to consider the instruments of observation as a kind of
prolongation of the sense organs of the observer, I consider the impredictable change of the state
by a single observation –in spite of the objective character of the results of every observation and
notwithstanding the statistical laws of frequencies of repeated observation under equal conditions– to
be an abandonment of the idea of the isolation (detachment) of the observer from the course
of physical events outside himself.
To put it in nontechnical common language one can compare the role of the observer in quantum
theory with that of a person, who by its freely chosen experimental arrangements and recordings
brings forth a considerable “trouble” in nature, without being able to influence its unpredictable
outcome and results which afterwards can be objectively checked by everyone.” W. Pauli ([41], p.60)
In quantum mechanics we cannot escape the fact that we are confronted with ourselves. This is not
the collapse of the wave function, but rather, the collapse of the Cartesian cut. As clearly expressed
by Heisenberg ([34], p.187): “I believe that one can formulate the emergence of the classical ‘path’ of a
particle pregnantly as follows: the ‘path’ comes into being only because we observe it.” The idea
of ‘measurement’ in the classical framework, as discovering an objective independent reality has nothing
to do with the idea of ‘measurement’ in the quantum description which presents us not only as discoverers
but also as creators of physical reality10.
1.2 The Quantum Perspective: The Schro¨dinger Wave Function
In quantum mechanics the state function |Ψ〉 can be expressed in different representations, each of which
is given in the formalism by different basis {B,B′, B′′, ...}. For each representation we obtain respectively
{|ΨB〉, |ΨB′〉, |ΨB′′〉, ...}11. We have to choose in which basis we are going to write the wave function.
Each representation/basis expresses a context which can be in principle incompatible to a different context.
10This idea has been developed by Diederik Aerts in the creation discovery view. See for example [4].
11More generally one can think in terms of density operators: firstly a ρ without a definite basis, and secondly,
{ρB , ρB′ , ρB′′ , ...} given by the density operator in each basis {B,B
′, B′′, ...}.
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This is were all the trouble starts: compatibility12. It has been proved by Kochen and Specker [40] that in
a Hilbert space d≥3, it is impossible to associate numerical values, 1 or 0, with every projection operator
Pm, in such a way that, if a set of it commuting Pm satisfies
∑
Pm = ∐, the corresponding values, namely
v(Pm) = 0 or 1, also satisfy
∑
v(Pm) = 1. This means that if we have three operators A, B and C, where
[A,B] = 0, [A,C] = 0 but [B,C] 6= 0 it is not the same to measure A alone, or A together with B, or
together with C13. It is the incompatibility of contexts; i.e. the impossibility of assigning a global truth
valuation to the projection operators of different contexts, which brings into stage the concept of choice.
In classical mechanics, due to the compatible structure, one can neglect this level. Classically the choice
of the context discovers (rather than creates) an element of physical reality, which of course was already
there... just as the moon is outside there without us having to chose anything at all.
Although one can still take an interpretation in which there is a preferred basis14 the choosing is then
transferred to the factorization which defines the system. We cannot escape the fact that we always have
to make a choice in order to define our system; the state function ρ is the condition of possibility for this
choice to take place. From our view point the indefinite (without a definite representation/basis) wave
function expresses a perspective, the precondition that makes possible the choice. As David Finkelstein
has argued:
“To speak of ‘the wave function of the system’ is a syntactic error. A wave function is not a
property of the system in any classical sense, but gives far more information about the experimenter.
[...] A wave function tells us more about the act of measurement than about the result. It is a verb,
not a noun; to treat it as a thing is a mistake in syntax. Having committed this error, one is forced to
follow with another, the idea of the collapse of the wave function. It is not ‘the’ wave function that
‘collapses.’ It is, rather, that first we do one thing, and then another.” D. Finkelstein ([31], p.292)
It is interesting to take into account the problem of objectivity within this approach. Quite often
‘choice’ is regarded as a subjective element of which the exact sciences might be better with out. As
D’Espagnat points out:
“Of course the statements that compose physics are objective. All are not so in the same way
however. Many, especially in classical physics, have such a form that, at least at the times of classical
physics, they could be understood by a conventional realist as faithfully describing attributes (or
existence) of “objects as they really are”. Let them be called “strongly objective”. Others explicitly
or implicitly involve in their very wording some reference to human actions, abilities and, last but
not least, perceptions. Let them be called “weakly objective”. Weakly objective statements, espe-
cially in the form of predictive observational rules, play quite a specially important role in quantum
mechanics.” D’Espagnat ([19], p.7)
Following Bernard D’Espagnat’s definitions the perspective can be thus considered as weakly objective.
It presents the possibility of choosing between different re. Once the basis has been chosen a definite
context enters the scene and the quantum entity is created. Furthermore, strong objectivity is regained
in the form of statistical causality15. It is ‘choice’, which appears explicitly in quantum mechanics, what
makes us face the problem of potentiality.
1.2.1 The Concept of “Ontological Potentiality”
The idea of regarding actuality as the real is a heavy burden in western though. Contrary to this
position, I would like to introduce the concept of ontological potentiality16 which presents us with the
most important character of potentiality, that of describing, as Aristotle expressed, a different form of
the being. Aristotle distinguishes between two types of potentiality. Firstly, generic potentiality: the
potentiality of a seed that can transform into a tree; this generical sense is not that which interests
12For an analysis of the concept of compatibility see for example the very interesting passage of the book of Asher Peres
[43], Chap. 7.
13For an analysis of the Kochen-Specker theorem see for example [14] and [7].
14Take for example the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation which relies on the Schmidt decomposition.
15Wolfgang Pauli expressed that the idea used in science of “nothing happens without a cause” no longer applies to
individual events in quantum mechanics and that only mean values have rationally analyzable causes. One is able to
recover the idea of causality in terms of a ‘statistical causality’ by taking into account a series of measurements.
16This concept is presented more extensively in [46].
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Aristotle but rather the second possibility, the potentiality as a mode of existence: the poet has the
capacity of not writing poems. It is not only the potentiality of doing this or that thing but rather the
potentiality of not-doing, potentiality of not being, of not passing to the actual. What is potential is
capable of being and not being. This is the problem of potentiality: the problem of possessing a faculty.
What do I mean when I say “I can”, “I cannot”.
“What is essential is that potentiality is not simply non-Being, simple privation, but rather the
existence of non Being, the presence of an absence; this is what we call a “faculty” or “power.” “To
have a faculty” means to have a privation. And potentiality is not a logical hypostasis but the mode
of existence of this privation. But how can an absence be present, how can a sensation exist as
anesthesia? This is the problem that interests Aristotle.” G. Agamben ([6], p.183)
In quantum mechanics we are faced with the concept of choice. The quantum state expresses the
potentiality of choosing a definite experimental arrangement, it is the condition of possibility for an
action to take place. This finds its limit in the mode of existence of a privation, a being which is and
is not at the same time. The central point of the concept of ontological potentiality is that it cannot be
reduced to actuality and presents us with a different form of the being, i.e. the necessity of considering
potentiality as ontologically independent of actuality. I think that in order to reach a deep understanding
of the quantum theory it is necessary to go further and develop this concept which allows us to think
quantum mechanics in a new fresh way. Wolfgang Pauli had foreseen this path and pointed directly to
it:
“Science today has now, I believe, arrived at a stage were it can proceed (albeit in a way as yet
not at all clear) along the path laid down by Aristotle. The complementarity characteristics of the
electron (and the atom) (wave and particle) are in fact “potential being,” but one of them is always
“actual nonbeing.” That is why one can say that science, being no longer classical, is for the
first time a genuine theory of becoming and no longer Platonic.” W. Pauli ([42], p.46, emphasis
added)
1.2.2 Entity in the Quantum Perspective
In the quantum perspective we have the undetermined wave function |Ψ〉; i.e. the wave function without
a determined representation. Before the choice has taken place it is not possible to define the entity.
The choice defines explicitly the quantum entity. It is wrong to think the wave function expresses
a subject (as opposed to an object) but rather it expresses the condition of possibility for the act of
subjectifying. There is no entity in the quantum perspective, nothing like a wave function of the universe
in any mechanistical sense is possible. Those who speak of the wave function of the universe seek for
an objective interpretation of the quantum formalism, however, if such thing as the wave function of the
unverse would exist, compatibility and choice would be superfluous turning quantum mechanics into a
classical scheme [5].
1.3 The Quantum Context: The Superposition State
Once we choose a representation; i.e. a basis or factorization, we define the quantum entity, which
is expressed by the Schro¨dinger wave function in a definite basis |ΨB〉 or more generally by a density
operator ρB. In this level there is potentiality in an ontological sense, although there is a distinction with
that one explained above, there is no choice involved in this level and, in this sense, strong objectivity is
regained in the form of statistical causality.
If quantum mechanics would be talking only about ensembles of systems this would be the end of the
story. Contrary to this position, we take quantum mechanics to describe individual entities represented by
density operators. Furthermore we stay close to the idea that the probability expressed in the formalism
has nothing to do with “lack of knowledge”.
“It was wave or quantum mechanics that was first able to assert the existence of primary prob-
abilities in the laws of nature, which accordingly do not admit of reduction to deterministic natural
laws by auxiliary hypotheses, as do for example the thermodynamic probabilities of classical physics.
This revolutionary consequence is regarded as irrevocable by the great majority of modern theoret-
ical physicists –primarily by M. Born, W. Heisenberg and N. Bohr, with whom I also associate
myself.” W. Pauli ([42], p.46)
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1.3.1 Potentiality
Heisenberg was very close to Platonic ideas17. From his young readings on the Timaeus one can trace
his idea that we must think of the micro-world as constituting of two different levels. The first level
of potentialities which is independent of observation and the second constituted by actualities which
we attain in our observation. The quantum mechanical formalism, and particularly its wave function,
describes the level of potentialities.
“In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and facts, with phenomena
that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But atoms or the elementary particles are
not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts” W.
Heisenberg ([36], p.160, emphasis added).
Heisenberg still regarded the superposition from a positivistic view in which potentiality is thought
as possible actualities. Where reality is again related to the actuality of an experimental observation.
Contrary to this position, within the complementary descriptions approach atoms and elementary parti-
cles, as described by quantum mechanics; i.e. by superpositions, are just as real as what we are used to
call things or facts. Furthermore the potentiality expressed in the quantum superposition is ontological.
A superposition expresses a unity, a single system in a different level to that of actuality. Thus, in the
quantum context potentiality is not expressed as a faculty, which is the expression of potentiality in
the perspectival level, but rather as an expression of the potential in a dialectical sense. Thus, being
and non-being should not be read in a propositional form, but rather, in a dialectical manner of which
becoming is the synthesis.
1.3.2 Entity in the Quantum Context
In the quantum context we recover the concept of entity: a pure state in a definite representation, |ΨB〉,
or more generally, an improper mixture18 given by a density operator ρB. An improper mixture denies the
possibility of applying an ignorance interpretation to its elements: it is not possible to think the system
is in one of the states, but due to our lack of knowledge, there is ignorance with respect to which. This
impossibility makes us face the holistic character of quantum mechanics and the need of an interpretation
which takes into account the unity of a superposition. I am willing to go still further and regard this
quantum entity as ontologically existent. A superposition expresses a different form of the being in terms
of ontological potentiality, Schro¨dinger cats being a clear example of this character. We will go in more
detail in this analysis in Sect. 2.2.
1.4 The Classical Context: Statistical Mechanics and Elements of Physical
Reality
Pauli repeatedly emphasized, that once the measuring apparatus is chosen, objective reality holds in the
sense that the observer ceases to have an influence on the outcome of the experiment and reproducibility
of the result is obtained in the form of objective probability laws for series of repeated measurements:
“...that in the systematic foundation of quantum mechanics one should start, more than it is done
so far (e.g. Dirac), from the composition and separation of systems. For this is –as Einstein rightly
felt– a very fundamental point of quantum mechanics which in addition, has a direct connection
with your considerations about the cut and the possibility of its displacement in the spot” W. Pauli
(quoted from [29], p.245)
The point stressed by Pauli pins the interpretational step which originates several of the paradoxes
emergent in quantum mechanics; i.e. the relation between the quantum context and the classical context.
To reconcile these complementary views one needs an interpretational jump which can bring together
the one and the many. The solution to this paradox has been developed by Bas Van Fraassen who was
able to recover the seemingly paradoxical relation between a proper and an improper mixture through the
distinction of a dynamical state and a value state. With this interpretational development it is possible
17For an exposition of his though see for example [36], [37] and [59].
18See [18], Chap. 6 for an explanation of the distinction between proper and improper mixture.
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to recover an objective probability in terms of ignorance without any inconsistency, this is from our view
the interpretational jump19 needed in order to go from the quantum context to the classical context.
“...the interpretation given to density operators is in terms of ignorance: [...] the interpretation
gives the probabilities of various possible states of affairs of which it is assumed that only one is
actually realized. From the point of view of the standard interpretation this combination of improper
mixture and an ignorance interpretation may seem paradoxical. To resolve the paradox, it is crucial
to notice the distinction which is made in the modal interpretation between physical properties and
mathematical states. The latter are defined in Hilbert space and encode probabilistic information
about the properties (values of physical magnitudes) which are present in the system itself. There
is no one-to-one relation between physical properties and mathematical states. Now, the ignorance
inherent in the modal interpretation pertains to physical properties; not to mathematical states. It
is not assumed that the description by ρ is incomplete and that some other state (namely a pure
state) would give a more complete description. The modal interpretation is therefore only in a quite
specific sense similar to the standard ignorance interpretation and the density operators are partial
traces, and in this sense improper mixtures. They cannot be considered as incomplete mathematical
state specifications (in contradiction to proper mixtures in the standard approach). But there still is
room for ignorance about the values of physical magnitudes!” D. Dieks and P. Veramaas ([25], p.155)
From the principle of complementary descriptions this distinction is taken to its last consequences
and determines two ontologically, complementary states; the holistic state and the reductionistic state20
which are ontologically equivalent but belong to the quantum and the classical levels respectively21. At
this point I escape the orthodox ‘empiricist view’:
“To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable phe-
nomena, and to recognize no objective modality in nature. To develop an empiricist account of science
is to depict it as involving a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual
and observable. Since scientific activity is an enormously rich and complex cultural phenomenon, this
account of science must be accompanied by auxiliary theories about scientific explanation, conceptual
commitment, modal language, and much else. But it must involve throughout a resolute rejection
of the demand for an explanation of the regularities in the observable course of nature, by means of
truths concerning a reality beyond what is actual and observable, as a demand which plays no role
in the scientific enterprise.” B. van Fraassen ([55], pp.202-203)
The idea of Van Fraassen is that: There is only one actual reality. Modalities are in our theories,
not in the world22. This is close to the position supported by Bohr, whom regarded the Schro¨dinger
wave function as an abstraction23 without any ontological meaning. Contrary to this view within the
complementary descriptions framework we regard the quantum description from an equal ontological
standpoint to the classical one. In this sense the formalism of quantum mechanics, and therefore a
superposition state reflects a character of reality just in the same way a Stern-Gerlach apparatus does;
there is no actuality voided of description.
It is important to notice that modal interpretations, as they stand, do not talk about ‘Schro¨dinger
cats’, superpositions, as ontologically existent entities24, they only talk about actual cats! I wish to stand
19I use the idea of jump as opposed to that of limit.
20In the modal interpretation the “holistic state” (superposition state) reflects the potential mode of the being; while the
“reductionistic state” (proper classical mixture) reflects the elements of physical reality. Van Fraassen calls them dynamical
and value state, while Dieks calls them mathematical state and physical state, respectively. The distinction in terminology
is not superfluous but expresses the philosophical attitude towards the interpretation of the theory. On the one hand,
Van Fraassen shows his empiricist attitude by assigning “reality” to the value of the actual term. Dieks, on the other
hand, makes a clear distinction between the levels of discourse: mathematical vs. physical. I would like to emphasize the
distinction between concepts and things as they are; in this sense holistic and reductionistic states are nothing more and
nothing less than useful descriptions.
21It is interesting to notice that the holistic and reductionistic state can be regarded as particular expressions of the
idea of potentiality as expressed by Aristotle; i.e. potentiality as a faculty (holistic state) and potentiality as becoming
(reductionistic state).
22See also [55], Sect. 5.
23“The symbolical character of Schro¨dinger’s method appears not only from the circumstance that its simplicity, similarly
to that of the matrix theory, depends essentially upon the use of imaginary arithmetic quantities.” (Bohr, quoted from [60],
p.111).
24This is being empirically tested an all the experiments seem to point out that Schro¨dinger cats, as individual entities,
do exist! See for example [33].
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for the opposite: Modalities are in the world, not only in our theories, they express a complementary
description of reality25. This determines an empirical distinction between my interpretation of quantum
mechanics and those which regard superpositions as void of an ontological status. The consequence of
such position with respect to modal interpretations will be further analyzed in future articles ([48] and
[49]).
1.5 The Empirical Description: Observation and Reference
In his famous ‘cat article’ of 1935 Schro¨dinger writes the following:
“Reality resists imitation trough a model. So one lets go of naive realism and leans
directly on the indubitable proposition that actually (for the physicist) after all
is said and done there is only observation, measurement. Then all our physical thinking
thenceforth has the sole basis and as sole object the results of measurements which can in principle
be carried out, for we must now explicitly not relate our thinking any longer to any kind of reality
or to a model. All numbers arising in our physical calculations must be interpreted as measurement
results. But since we didn’t just now come into the world and start to build up our science from
scratch, but rather have in use a quite definite scheme of calculation, from which in view of the
great progress in Q.M. we would less than ever want to be parted, we see ourselves forced to dictate
from writing-table which measurements are in principle possible, that is, must be possible in order
to support adequately our reckoning system.” Schro¨dinger ([51], p.156, emphasis added)
It is important to notice that, even though one is not willing to remain a naive realist, one should
as well reflect on the idea that observation and measurement are (even for the physicists) indubitable
propositions. I am not wiling to give this metaphysical presupposition for granted. This is the problem
of the justification of experimental observation which is as well the problem of subjectivity. If one does
not rely on ontology, observation looses content, meaning. There is no possible observation without
an ontology on which the phenomena can be embedded26. Einstein pointed out this to Heisenberg “it
is only the theory which decides what can be observed.” This remark, as Heisenberg recalls in his own
autobiography, Der Teil und das Ganze, was the idea that lead him to the uncertainty relations.
Before considering the question of Einstein: What can be considered as an element of physical reality in
the theory? We must go back to the problem posed to some extent by Bohr: What is given as empirically
adequate? What is a phenomenon? What are the conditions by which I can access a phenomenon?
In the kantian approach experimental observation presupposes certain preconditions, certain categories
and forms of intuition which allows us to grasp a certain phenomena from the manifold of data. In
quantum mechanics there is an indeterministic jump from the possible to the actual by which we are able
to recover our classical space-time description, and thus, a separated entity (the spot on the photographic
plate). However, the character of this ‘problematic jump’ should be clearly specified; this is to great extent
the question of which are the preconceptions stated in the phrase: a black spot appears in the photographic
plate of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus at the end of the experiment (this will be analyzed more carefully in
section 2.1).
The complementary descriptions approach does not evade any ontological commitment. It is in this
sense a position half way between Einstein’s ontic view and Bohr’s epistemological attitude –we are able
to maintain a plurality of ontologies and at the same time take into account the epistemological problems
which are determined by such an election. Within the complementary descriptions approach we consider
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus (with all its meaning and symbolism) as a description in itself not more, not
less objective than the one presented in the quantum mechanical formalism in the Hilbert space. Dieks
is correct to conclude that if one is willing to assume certain realism upon the description one develops,
the structure of this description must be taken seriously:
25It is interesting to point out that van Fraassen’s position is very close to that of Bohr, who pointed out the importance
of the classical concepts, which defined the phenomena, and he repeatedly stressed the fact that the wave function should
only be considered as an abstraction.
26Michel Bitbol [8] has also called the attention upon the relation between description and theory through the name
epistemological circle: “Par ‘cercle epistemologuique’ j’entends la relation re´ciproque auto-consistente entre une theorie
scientifique et la maniere dont celle the´orie conduit a se figurer en retour le processus par lequel il a e´te´ possible de la
formuler et de l’attester.”
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“The quantum realism [...] provides us with an abstract structural description. The irreducibly
stochastic level of observations is subsumed under a theoretical framework with a deterministic evo-
lution law; its structure is the non-classical structure of a Hilbert space. The world has, if we accept
elementary quantum mechanics as descriptive, this same structure.” D. Dieks ([22], p.1418)
In relation to this distinction, one must also acknowledge that the Stern-Gerlach in my laboratory and
the name which we use to make reference to it: “Stern-Gerlach” are not the same. It is the limitation in
language which must be acknowledged when discussing the interpretation of a theory. In the quantum
description as well as in the classical description “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world”27:
“Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. Let
us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture
these make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the
surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square if it is white black or
white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form
is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with triangular or hexagonal
mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the description simpler: that is to say,
it might be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than
with a fine square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems
for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that
all propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given
set of propositions–the axionms of mechanics.” L. Wittgenstein ([61], pp.81-82, Sect. 6.341)
We have presented a scheme were there is a complementary relation between the actual observation
that takes place and the statistical description with which one is able to immerse this particular result in
the classical context. As it is well known Bohr expressed repeatedly the necessity of always using classical
concepts in order to describe experimental setups28. This necessary condition can be understood within
the present scheme as the necessary condition for the quantum context to allow a meeting point through
the classical context with the actuality of an experimental outcome.
To summarize, I have presented different levels of description which take place in the process of the
quantum measurement, the quantum perspective described by the indefinite Schro¨dinger wave function,
the quantum context described by the quantum superposition (an improper mixture); the classical context
described by a proper mixture in which superpositions are neglected and we regain statistical causality
as well as the elements of physical reality; and finally, the empirical world, that which pertains to our
personal experience. In the following section I will try to show more clearly, through some of the most
paradigmatic experiments of quantum theory, how these levels are related.
2 Complementary Descriptions and Quantum Mechanics
I would like now to approach from the principle of complementary descriptions the more general problems
regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly, I will analyze the Stern-Gerlach experiment.
Secondly, I will address the Schro¨dinger cat paradox. Last but not least, I will analyze the Bell inequalities
and the classical to quantum limit in the light of the hidden measurement approach developed by the
Brussels group.
2.1 The Neverending Stern-Gerlach Experiment
Let’s discuss in some detail the Stern-Gerlach experiment in the light of the definitions expressed above.
If we choose to describe the apparatus classically, we must consider an object with a definite space time
position; in this case we describe the magnet and the photographic plate with classical concepts. One
must agree that the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, as Bohr repeatedly emphasized, is nothing but a classical
object with a definite position in space and time, with all the monadic properties which make this
object a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. What I want to stress is that already talking about a Stern-Gerlach
27Wittgenstein quoted from [61], Sect. 5.6.
28Bohr (quoted from [60], p.4) maintained that: “The experimental conditions can be varied in many ways, but the point
is that in each case we must be able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have learned, and therefore
the functioning of instruments must be described within the framework of classical physical ideas.” (emphasis added).
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apparatus presupposes a description, namely, a classical one. However, we could also choose to describe
our experiment in a “purely” quantum mechanical way. If we take for instance a closed room with the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus inside we must also take into account the great number of particles composing
the magnet, the photographic plate and even the photons and particles of air in the room29. Clearly this
description exceeds by far the skills of the most capable and obsessive experimental physicist, anyhow it
should be possible in principle as it was once proposed by Laplace in classical mechanics. What should
be clearly noticed is that this, and only this would be the pure quantum mechanical description, namely,
“the description of the whole room by a quantum density operator ρ”. However, one must acknowledge
that this phrase is already a paradox in itself, a mixture of two incompatible languages. Talking about
a room with an apparatus and so on, again, presupposes a classical description; classical objects exist in
themselves, independently of any choice. This is not true for quantum mechanics.
Now, what is normally done when analyzing this experiment, without any explicit remark, is an
implicit coarse graining within the quantum description: one makes a cut between an elementary quantum
state and a classical pointer state. In this subtle point that we take often for granted in the study of
measurement interaction is the malefic seed which will grow up to a quantum jump. If we would describe
the experiment truly quantum mechanically, we must be aware that the quantum mechanical state which
describes the complete room in which we have the system, the apparatus, and the rest of the particles
(called commonly environment) will always evolve unitary in time with the Schro¨dinger equation of
motion:
ih¯
∂
∂t
ρ = [H, ρ] (1)
This means that although some correlation30 may lead, at some definite time, to correlations which
might be related to a black spot in one of the sides of the photographic plate, at a future time, due to
the infinite evolution of the quantum mechanical state, this black spot correlations might ‘reconstruct’
themselves from the particles and photons in the air, and could ‘whiten’ back into the initial state of the
photographic plate. Even worse, the black spot, if the experimenter is sufficiently patient (maybe 1050
years?), might appear in the lower side! But why should we then consider the experiment is finished,
if we have shown, that if we describe things quantum mechanically, there is no such end in the act of
measurement (as the state keeps evolving)? The only things we have are potential quantum mechanical
correlations evolving till the end of time.
The point is that the quantum mechanical description is not very practical when taken to its lasts
fundamental character, what we normally do is to take some crucial decisions for all practical proposes
(FAPP). First, what are the degrees of freedom of interest, and second, when does the experiment end.
The first implies a choice in the representation, a path from the quantum perspective to the definite
context. This choice makes possible to relate the quantum state (in the quantum context) with the
pointer state of the apparatus (in the classical context); this cut defines which is the system and which is
the apparatus31. It is important to notice that already here we are dealing with an interpretational jump
relating both quantum and classical descriptions. In the second step, we choose the instant in which the
experiment is finished; this is not a ‘real fact of nature’ but rather a ‘psychological illusion’ brought into
by the structure with which we comprehend the classical world (and the fact that we cannot wait so
long, maybe 1050 years, to see the miraculous change of the black spot from the upper side to the lower
side). These two choices hide the quantum jump and the relation between the quantum and classical
descriptions.
Rene´ Descartes, in his Regulae, rules for the direction of mind, presented an identification between
‘truth’ and ‘clear and distinctive idea’. Modern science has taken this distinction to its most impressive
results leading to a definite cut between object and subject. However, one should not disregard that
the problem of objectivity, this is, the impossibility of giving a justification of such a relation between
an empirical experience and truth remains as powerful and vivid as before. To this point science has
presented a dicovery-view of objective truths, neglecting the creative element which is at stage in every
29One should be aware of the phrase of Bohr “we are suspended in language.” We have to speak using our language,
which has not yet been developed to take into account quantum mechanics, in quantum mechanics it is meaningless to
speak of “particles” in the classical sense, however, in this case we are forced to push the words to their limits.
30It is important to notice that quantum mechanics only provides correlations and nothing like definite states; whatever
that might mean.
31It substantializes our quantum description by defining entities (elements of physical reality). Substance in place of
correlations; stability instead of movement.
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act of observation. As Bohr repeatedly stressed, this is the epistemological lesson that quantum mechanics
taught us, that: “We are not merely observers, but also actors, in the great drama of the world.”
2.2 Schro¨dinger cats do exist!
I would like now to consider the very interesting approach by Dennis Dieks [20] with respect to the
‘Schro¨dinger’s cat’ paradox [51] and go still further in the conclusion which should be addressed by the
complementary descriptions approach.
Quantum mechanics predicts the following state for the combined system of atom and cat:
|Cat〉 = 1√
2
(|up〉 |Dead〉+ |down〉 |Alive〉) (2)
The peculiarity of quantum mechanics shows itself in the further conclusion that the combined system
of closed box and its contents is represented by a coherent superposition. The fact that the cat is dead or
alive is taken to imply, in the orthodox interpretation, that only (|up〉 |Dead〉) or (|down〉 |Alive〉) can be
the correct theoretical descriptions. It is assumed by Schro¨dinger that what we call physical systems in
everyday language must be represented in the quantum mechanical formalism by individual state vectors,
in close analogy to the familiar practice of classical mechanics where “physical systems” are represented
by points in a phase space. Dieks points out in this respect that:
“The language that we use in our observation reports is the everyday language, refined by classical
physics. In this sense we use concepts like “electrical current”, “charge”, and “particle”. Of course,
such terms carry the connotations associated with them by classical physics. But it has to be noted
that in a restricted experimental context not all the components of the meaning given to these concepts
by classical physics are relevant and actually accessible to observation [...] the position of a “particle”
is actually measured whereas momentum remains “hidden” in the experiment in question...” D. Dieks
([21], p.1414)
Furthermore, what should be noticed is that a language determines in itself an ontology, and that
quantum mechanics, as a mathematical language will not be necessarily connected with the classical lan-
guage; on the contrary we have been pointing out that what is lacking is an adequate semantical language
which can express correctly the concepts hidden in the quantum formalism. There is a stubbornness in
modern physics by which once and again we try to explain quantum mechanics with the ‘old’ classical
concepts. This would be tantamount to explain general relativity only with the Newtonian concepts of
absolute space and time, the reader might already feel the bunch of beautiful paradoxes that would arise.
The empirical observation that the cat is dead or alive does not automatically entail a particular
theoretical representation. According to the interpretational rule given by the modal interpretation,
the observation that the cat is dead or alive, both support the theoretical description by means of the
superposition:
“It is the state vector which is a superposition, not the cat itself. “State vector” and “cat” are
two concepts at different levels of discourse...” D. Dieks ([20], p.189)
We can see already that this approach fits perfectly with the complementary descriptions approach.
On the one hand the superposition is a mathematical formulation which lies in the quantum context.
On the other hand, a cat belongs to a classical account of reality. The distance I take from most of
the modal theorist (for example [26], [56] and [57]) is an ontological one. While most of them consider
the Schro¨dinger cat to be a theoretical entity I consider the quantum superpositions to be ontologically
independent. The superposition described by quantum mechanics should be regarded as an entity not less
objective than the concept ‘cat’ which is used to make reference to the cat which is sitting right in front
of my desk. Once again one should clearly acknowledge from which level one is speaking; it is important
to stress in this sense that the name “cat” is a concept, nothing more nothing less, it does not capture
the thing. The concept “cat” (which is certainly not the cat in my desk) and the concept “superposition”
(which is certainly not the cat in my desk) pertain to complementary languages. It is through languages
and descriptions with which we can make reference and create reality.
I argue that an interesting interpretation of the quantum superposition relies on the concept of po-
tentiality; assuming, as we do, an ontological potentiality we are able to sustain the interpretation of such
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a non-classical entity without the common reduction into actuality. A superposition is and is not at the
same time, it denies the principle of non contradiction opening a new descriptive level which should be
further analyzed and developed32. The quantum superposition and the classical cat are two entities in
two different levels of description, these are not necessarily in contradiction, but only together can give
us a better understanding of the relations between all the possible conceptual schemes that can be used
to describe reality.
2.3 Aerts’ Non-Kolmogorovian Macroscopic System
It is well known that in the category of probability models Accardi has given a definition of a Kol-
mogorovian probability model, which is the probability model of a classical system, and a quantum prob-
ability model which is the probability model of a quantum system. These two probability models have
a completely different structure. It was believed for long that such a structural relation was the main
characteristic between the classical macroscopic world and the quantum microscopical world.
Accardi was able to derive a set of inequalities (which can then be compared with experimental
results) that characterize the Kolmogorovian model and shows that these inequalities can always be
violated by experiments with a quantum system. At the same time Diederik Aerts [1] was able to
build a macroscopic classical system that violates Bell inequalities. Since Accardi had shown that Bell
inequalities are equivalent to inequalities characterizing a Kolmogorovian probability model and Aerts
had proved that it was possible to construct a classical system which violated the Bell inequalities,
Diederik Aerts had given an example of a “classical” system having a non-Kolmogorovian probability
model. Aerts ([3], p.203) points out: “This was very amazing, and the classification made by a lot
of physicists of a microworld described by quantum mechanics and a macroworld described by classical
physics was challenged completely”. Aerts showed that:
“If we have a physical system S and we have a lack of knowledge about the state of S, then a theory
describing this situation is necessarily a classical statistical theory having a classical Kolmogorovian
probability model. If we have a physical system S, and a measurement e on this physical system S,
and the situation is such that we do not have lack of knowledge about the system S, but we do have
lack of knowledge about the measurement e, then we cannot describe this situation by a classical
statistical theory, because the probability model that arises is non-Kolmogorovian.” D. Aerts ([3],
p.203)
When I got to the Brussels group and learned about all these results I was completely shocked. To
some extent I was confronted with my earlier thought about the concept of complementarity. I would like
to read all these results now from the principle of complementary descriptions: the work of Aerts shows
that the entity under consideration will be a quantum or classical object regardless of its macroscopic
or microscopic ‘shape’ but from the description one chooses to make of the entity. From this, we can
conclude that macroscopicity and microscopicity are not the main characteristics that determine the
quantum and the classical but rather that quantum and classical are two different and complementary
levels of description.
“If we accept our explanation for the probabilities of quantum mechanics, namely that they are
due to a lack of knowledge about measurements, then these probabilities are not more ontological
than ordinary probabilities. They form a non-classical probability model because they correspond
to a different physical situation, namely the physical situation where we lack knowledge about mea-
surements and not about the state of the system. It is clear that such a physical situation can be
found, as well, in the macroworld. We have shown this based in our examples. We can now ask
why nonclassical probabilities only appeared in the microworld. In the light of our hypothesis, the
answer would be that the type of measurement, introducing non-classical probabilities, is never used
to describe a macroscopic system, because we have enough other measurements to replace them. This
is no longer the case in the microworld.” D. Aerts ([3], p.203)
I would like to emphasize it is misleading to think that the hidden measurement approach opens the
door for a realistic (even deterministic) description of the quantum entity. It should be clearly stated that
32See for example [17] were the it is clearly stated the importance of paraconsistent logics within the formulation of
quantum mechanics.
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determinism is a presupposition of the model and should not be regarded as welcome back to a classical
description. For me, the most interesting teaching of the ‘vessels of water’ experiment [2] is the fact that
it presents a classical system which has a non-kolmogorovian probability model. The conclusion that
quantum mechanics can have a deterministic description should not be regarded as an embracing of the
Laplacean spirit, something which by no means can be justified, not even in classical physics and which
Cassirer [15] has shown, leads to contradictions. The hidden measurements approach has to do with our
ignorance and the determination of the model with which we want to approach reality, but it does not
discover the deterministic nor indeterministic character; rather, it makes explicit the fact that the way
in which we approach nature determines our model of it33. Determinism and indeterminism cannot be
extended beyond the limits of experience but must themselves be understood and defined as one of the
conditions of the possibility of experience; they do not follow in any way from the description we choose to
make about nature, but are rather a consequence of it. What is really shown in the hidden measurements
approach is that the structure with which we choose to describe a certain system determines in an explicit
way what we will find.
“We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound
theories, one after another, to account for its origins. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing
the creature that made the footprint. And lo! It is our own.” Sir Arthur Eddington [28]
Conclusions
I have presented a view as a starting point to develop a conception of science in which it is acknowledged
the different possibilities of a path with no end. The distinction between different levels of descriptions
evades the mistake of making confusing relations between concepts of different incompatible schemes. As
we have shown in several examples the main creation of paradoxes and weirdness of quantum mechanics
comes from mixing concepts which pertain to different levels of description.
I think it safe to say that the idea of understanding has been deeply misunderstood, this misunder-
standing has closed the doors of the quantum theory. The complementary descriptions approach presents
an interpretation of quantum mechanics which turns its attention to new concepts such as ontological
potentiality. I believe the development of such concepts will allow to present more clearly the experiments
which are being performed at present with superposition states. We have been looking during several
decades through the key-hole of the atomic description, the creation of new concepts is the missing key
which can open the doors of the quantum theory.
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